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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*
The 1989 session of the General Assembly enacted legislation
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or re-
pealed a number of sections of the Code of Virginia (the "Code").
In addition to this legislation, there were twelve cases from the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, one case from Virginia's intermediate
court of appeals, and one federal case in the year ending June 1,
1989, that involved issues of interest to both the general practi-
tioner and the specialist in wills, trusts, and estates. This article
analyzes each of these legislative and judicial developments.1
I. 1989 LEGISLATION
A. Professional Law Corporations May Qualify as Fiduciary
New section 13.1-546.1 provides that professional law corpora-
tions may, as a part of the practice of law, act as an executor, trus-
tee or administrator of an estate, or guardian for an infant, or in
any other fiduciary capacity. This section also provides that, where
there is such a qualification, all necessary fiduciary responsibilities
to be performed on behalf of the law corporation must be per-
formed by an officer, employee or agent who is a licensed Virginia
attorney.2 Virginia law does not impose a corresponding require-
ment upon banking corporations serving in a fiduciary capacity.
This section may create an ethical problem because it is unlikely
that a client will know that the attorney's professional corporation
can serve in this capacity unless the attorney so advises the client,
and such a communication might easily be interpreted as an invi-
tation to name the corporation. If so, what is the impact of the
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; Member of the
Virginia Bar; B.A., 1965, College of Williams and Mary; J.D., 1967, College of William and
Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Virginia sections, they will be
referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated, those section
numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 1989 supplement for
the new sections.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-546.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
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Ethical Consideration that states, "A lawyer should not con-
sciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or law-
yer in an instrument"?' An advisory opinion from the Virginia
Bar's standing committee on legal ethics, clarifying the application
of this ethical consideration to these new circumstances, would be
helpful to the bar.
B. Guardian of the Person of a Minor
One of the reasons why parents of minor children are en-
couraged to write wills is to provide for a guardian of the person,
or substitute parent, to raise their children if both parents should
die prematurely. This important area of the law is clarified and
expanded by the amendment of four Code sections as follows: (i) to
codify the separate office of guardian of the person of a minor and
to authorize a parent to make such a testamentary appointment;4
(ii) to provide that a guardian of a minor's estate will have custody
of the person of a parentless ward unless a guardian of the person
has been appointed by a parent or the court;5 (iii) to provide that
nonresidence of an individual shall not prevent the qualification of
the individual to serve as the sole guardian of the person of a mi-
nor;6 and (iv) to eliminate language relating to certain courts in the
City of Richmond that no longer exist.7
C. Uniform Transfers to Minors Act
This extensive revision and restatement of the former Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act s was enacted by the 1988 session of the Gen-
eral Assembly. As enacted, section 31-45(D) authorized certain
transfers of property9 to a "minor" to contain language expressly
3. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-6 (1983). The remainder of this
ethical consideration provides that "[iln those cases where a client wishes to name his law-
yer as such, care should be taken to avoid even the appearance of impropriety." Id.
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-2 (Cum. Supp. 1989). This section further provides that the nomi-
nated guardian is not entitled to the custody of a minor child so long as either parent is
surviving and is a "fit and proper person to have the custody of such child." Id.
5. Id. § 31-8.
6. Id. § 26-59(D).
7. Id. § 31-4.
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-26 to -36 (Repl. Vol. 1985). The revised sections are entitled the
Virginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. Id. §§ 31-37 to -59 (Cum. Supp. 1989). For a
brief introduction to the 1988 legislation, and the Virginia variations to the official text, see
Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH. L. REV.
759, 768-71 (1988).
9. The transfers in question are transfers by gift or exercise of power of appointment (§
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providing for the age of majority to be twenty-one instead of eigh-
teen. As thus written, the use of this vehicle was precluded for pro-
spective donees between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. To
remedy this problem, section 31-45(D) is amended by substituting
"individual under the age of twenty-one" in place of "minor" at
this point. This section is further amended to provide that, when
one chooses the age twenty-one option, the word "minor" through-
out the act will mean a person under age twenty-one.' 0 Technical
amendments are also made to sections 64.1-57(1) and 64.1-57(4) to
provide for references to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act to be
construed as references to the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act."
D. Fiduciary Powers: Incorporation by Reference
Section 64.1-57 was originally enacted in 1966 to provide a list-
ing of various administrative powers, all or any of which might be
incorporated by reference into a will or trust instrument. 2 In 1976,
this section was amended to authorize the incorporation of the
powers existing (i) on the date of the document's execution or (ii)
on the date of death. The 1976 amendment further provided that,
unless the document expressed a contrary intention, the incorpora-
tion would be of those powers existing at the time the instrument
was executed rather than at the time of death.'3 The 1989 amend-
ment reverses this rule and provides that, absent a contrary intent
expressed in the document, "the incorporation by reference of
powers enumerated by this statute shall refer to those powers ex-
isting at the time of death.' 4 This may create a pitfall for the un-
wary lawyer drafting an irrevocable inter vivos trust, after July 1,
1989 which purports to incorporate this statutory boilerplate but
which does not expressly state "as existing at the time this docu-
ment is executed." In such a case the trustee would have the pow-
ers that exist on the settlor's death, but there will be uncertainty
concerning what powers, if any, the trustee has prior to that time.
31-40), and transfers authorized by will or trust (§ 31-41).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-45(D) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
11. Id. §§ 64.1-57(1), -57(4). Section 64.1-57 is the section that allows a variety of "boiler-
plate" administrative powers to be incorporated by reference into a will or trust.
12. 1966 Va. Acts 425 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64-57.2 (Cum. Supp. 1966)).
13. 1976 Va. Acts 419 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57 (Cum. Supp. 1976)).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(4) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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E. Natural Death Act: Form of Declaration
Section 54.1-2984 of the Natural Death Act of Virginia 5 pro-
vides a suggested form of a written declaration for one's use to di-
rect that life prolonging procedures be withheld or withdrawn
under certain circumstances. 16 The 1989 amendment provides for
an additional option whereby the declarant may designate another
to make the decision about the use of life prolonging procedures if
the declarant is comatose, incompetent or otherwise mentally or
physically incapable of communication at the time in question.'"
F. Health Care Decisions: Power of Attorney
New section 37.1-134.4 establishes additional procedures for sur-
rogate treatment decision making on behalf of adult persons who,
due to illness or injury which precludes communication or impairs
judgement, are unable to make informed medical decisions.' s The
priorities of those authorized to give consent to the physician are
as follows: (i) a person designated in a writing executed pursuant
to section 54.1-2984, if given such authority in the writing; 9 (ii) a
guardian or committee currently authorized to make such deci-
sions; (iii) an attorney-in-fact appointed under a durable power of
attorney, to the extent the power grants the authority to make
such a decision;20 or (iv) five separate classes of relatives.2' This
statutory recognition of the durable power of attorney22 as a means
15. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Supp. 1989) (originally en-
acted as 1983 Va. Acts 532).
16. These circumstances are (i) a terminal condition, (ii) the attending physician has de-
termined that there can be no recovery from such condition, (iii) death is imminent, and (iv)
the application of life-prolonging procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the dy-
ing process. Id. § 54.1-2984.
17. Id. § 54.1-2984 (Supp. 1989).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
19. The reference to section 54.1-2984 is to the section containing the suggested form for
a declaration under the Natural Death Act. See the discussion supra p.6, para.E. However
this suggested form makes no reference to health-care decisions except for the decision con-
cerning "whether life prolonging procedures shall be withheld or withdrawn." The suggested
form does provide that it "may include other specific directions" but it is less than clear
that it contemplates anything other than "final" decisions. Moreover it seems somewhat
unusual to place directions concerning the care of the living into a portion of the Code
designed to do with dying.
20. The use of an attorney-in-fact employed by the physician or the organization employ-
ing the physician is not permitted.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
22. Under the common law, a power of attorney was revoked by operation of law upon the
happening of certain events, one of which was the incapacity of the principal. The "durable"
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of authorizing another to make medical decisions on one's behalf
(priority (iii)) is a good answer to a genuine need and, as its exis-
tence becomes known, this option will probably be routinely of-
fered to all clients as a part of the standard will interview.
However, three problems have been created by a sentence in this
statute that imposes an inquiry duty upon physicians.2 3 First,
there is the question of a busy physician's willingness to invest the
time that may be required to make the necessary factual investiga-
tion. Second, there is the problem of the physician correctly identi-
fying the "next-of-kin" to whom the inquiry must be directed. Al-
though the term "next-of-kin" is not defined in the statute, the
Supreme Court of Virginia stated in a recent will interpretation
case that it is "a nontechnical term whose commonly accepted
meaning is 'nearest in blood.'"24 Query: Where does this leave
one's spouse, who might otherwise be considered the most appro-
priate person to contact? Third, there is the question of the physi-
cian's ability to make the legal judgment concerning the existence
of "any ground for questioning the authority apparently con-
ferred." It is difficult to see how this new power will be able to
approach its potential so long as this sentence remains in the Code,
and it is respectfully submitted that it should be eliminated by
1990-91 Session.
G. Spendthrift Trusts
In response to a 1988 decision from the Fourth Circuit holding
that a trust cannot be a spendthrift trust under Virginia law ex-
cept to the extent it is limited to the "support" of the benefi-
ciary," section 55-19 was amended by rewriting the phrase "ap-
power of attorney, a concept that originated in Virginia in 1954 (1954 Va. Acts 486) and has
now spread to all of the other states, describes a power that is immune from this specific
revocation. In Virginia, a power is made "durable" by stating, "'This power of attorney (or
his authority) shall not terminate on disability of the principal' or other words showing the
intent of the principal that such power or authority shall not terminate upon his disability."
VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
23. "In cases where the physician intends to rely upon the authority apparently conferred
by a durable power of attorney, he shall use reasonable efforts to contact the patient's next-
of-kin, if known, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is any ground for questioning
the authority apparently conferred by the durable power of attorney." VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-
134.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
24. Elmore v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 232 Va. 310, 314, 350 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1986).
25. Levy v. First Va. Bank, 845 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussed in Johnson, Wills,
Trusts, and Estates. Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 759, 777-79
(1988)).
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plied by the trustee to the support and maintenance of the
beneficiaries" to read "paid to or applied by the trustee for the
benefit of the beneficiaries. "26
While this legislation was moving through the committee pro-
cess, a further concern developed based upon this section's lan-
guage authorizing property to be held in spendthrift trust upon the
condition that the corpus or income "shall be applied. 2 7 It was
feared that a literal reading of this language might lead one to the
conclusion that only trusts with mandatory, as contrasted with dis-
cretionary, payout provisions could qualify as a spendthrift trust
under the statute. In order to prevent this result, and to insure
that a discretionary trust may be a spendthrift trust if the settlor
so intends, this portion of section 55-19 was rewritten to read
"shall in the case of a simple trust or, in the case of a complex
trust, may in the discretion of the fiduciary be . . .applied."2"
Lastly, in order to insure that no question will arise concerning
the law applicable to trusts already in existence, this legislation
also provides "[t]hat this act is declaratory of existing law."'29
H. Termination of Small Trusts
For a variety of reasons the corpus of a trust may be reduced to
the point where it is no longer economically practicable to continue
the trust's operation as originally designed. In recognition of this
problem, and the fact that some attorneys fail to provide a solution
thereto in their documents, section 55-19.2 was enacted in 1986 to
authorize judicial termination of a trust that is depleted or reduced
by expenditures down to a corpus of $15,000 or less.3"
The 1989 amendment to section 55-19.2 eliminates the "depleted
or reduced by expenditures" language in order that this judicial
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (Cum. Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
27. Id. (Repl. Vol. 1986) (emphasis added).
28. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
The term "simple trust" refers to a trust described in IRC § 651 (1986) which, in addition
to other requirements, is required to distribute all of its income currently (i.e., a mandatory
payout trust); the term "complex trust" refers to a trust described in IRC § 661 (1986)
which, in addition to other requirements, may accumulate income (i.e., a discretionary
trust). Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-l(b) (1989).
29. 1989 Va. Acts 600, cl. 2.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.2 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1989). For a further discus-
sion of this statute, and language that might be used in a will or trust in order to avoid any
need for its use, see Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law,
20 U. RICH. L. REV. 955, 962-63 (1986).
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termination remedy might also be applicable to a trust with a
corpus below the $15,000 threshold at the outset." In order to
guarantee that this enlarged remedy will be applicable to trusts
already in existence, this legislation further provides "[t]hat this
act is declaratory of existing law."'3 2 In order to insure that this
procedure is not used prematurely, further language is added to
provide that this section's remedy is available only if there is "no
expectation of additions to the principal other than from interest
or earnings. '33
I. Probate Avoidance: Transfer of Title to Stock
The Code contains numerous probate avoidance statutes that fa-
cilitate the transfer of title to property from the dead to the living
by eliminating the need to employ the traditional probate process
in certain circumstances. One of these probate avoidance statutes
is section 64.1-123.1, enacted in 1977,' 4 which has provided a per-
missive non-probate procedure for the transfer of small amounts of
corporate stock ($5,000 or less of a particular issuer) to the dece-
dent's spouse or, if none, the decedent's distributees. In the year
following its enactment, this section was amended to restrict its
remedy to cases where the stock was issued by a corporation "or-
ganized under the laws of Virginia."3 5 The 1989 amendment to sec-
tion 64.1-123.1 eliminates this restrictive language and thus ex-
tends the potential of this section's remedy.3 6
J. Probate Avoidance: Transfer of Title to Motor Vehicle
Section 46.1-94 was a probate avoidance statute which provided
that, if there had been no qualification upon a decedent's estate,
any legatee or distributee might transfer title to the decedent's
motor vehicle upon presenting a statement of certain facts to the
Department of Motor Vehicles.3 7 As a consequence of the 1989 re-
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
32. 1989 Va. Acts 166, cl. 2.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989). The portion of the judicial termina-
tion statute applicable to cemetery trusts is also amended to provide an additional forum
for the judicial proceeding beyond the circuit court of the county or city in which the ceme-
tery or any part thereof is located, viz. "the county or city in which the trustee resides or
has its registered office." Id. § 55-19(c).
34. 1977 Va. Acts 148 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
35. 1979 Va. Acts 281 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-94 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
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vision of title 46.1, this statute now appears as section 46.2-634,
and "the language in this section has been simplified, but no sig-
nificant changes have been made." 3s
One might suggest, however, that some changes are in order for
the official form that is used to implement this remedy. According
to section 46.2-634, the statement filed with the Department of
Motor Vehicles must list everyone having an interest in the motor
vehicle, but it need only be signed by such of them as are of legal
age. However, the official form 9 used for this purpose provides for
the listing of only "adult legal heirs ' 40 and their signatures; and
the instructions on the back of the form state that if an intestate
decedent leaves a spouse and children by a previous marriage "the
surviving spouse and all heirs or their legal guardians must com-
plete this form." 41
K. Transfer of Title to Watercraft
New section 29.1-717.2 42 applies to transfers by operation of law
of watercraft titled under section 29.1-713.13 For purposes of this
section, a transfer to anyone as legatee or distributee is a transfer
by operation of law. Although the language of this section is some-
what ambiguous, it appears to contemplate only a probate transfer
as contrasted with the probate-avoidance procedure available for
motor vehicles.
L. Presumption of Death from Absence or Disappearance
Section 64.1-105, dealing with the presumption of death that
arises from a person's absence or disappearance for a period of
time, has been applicable to non-residents only insofar as any real
estate located in Virginia is concerned. The amendment extends
38. 1989 Va. Acts 727 (Revisors' Note to Section 46.2-634).
39. VSA 24 (Rev. 6/83).
40. When a decedent leaves surviving children or their descendants, one or more of whom
are not children or descendants of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse is a distributee
of one-third of the decedent's personal property which would include the decedent's motor
vehicle; however such a spouse is not an "heir" of the decedent. Carter v. King, 233 Va. 60,
353 S.E.2d 738 (1987).
41. VSA 24 (Rev. 6/83), Instruction 2.B.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-717.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
43. Id. § 29.1-713.
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the application of this statute to non-residents "owning . . .per-
sonal property herein." 44
M. Statute of Limitations
When a person entitled to bring a cause of action dies (with no
action pending and before the statute has run) section 8.01-
229(B)(1) provides that the decedent's personal representative may
bring the action (i) within the period of time remaining in the orig-
inal limitation period, or (ii) within one year from the personal
representative's qualification, whichever is the longer. The amend-
ment provides that the period of time remaining in the original
limitation period will be computed by "including the limitation pe-
riod as provided by subdivision (E)(3)." 4
N. Illegitimate Persons: Determination of Parentage
In 1988, the General Assembly repealed section 20-61.1, entitled
"Support of children of unwed parents by father; evidence of pa-
ternity, ' 46 and added Chapter 3.1 to Title 20, entitled "Proceed-
ings to Determine Parentage. 47 However, corresponding amend-
ments reflecting this change were not made (i) to section 64.1-
5.1.3(iii), 48 relating to the time within which an illegitimate's claim
of succession must be filed, or (ii) to section 64.1-5.2, 4 relating to
the limitation on evidence admissible to show paternity for pur-
poses of succession. 50 The 1989 amendments to these code sections
eliminate this problem by making the relevant portion of each sec-
tion read "former § 20-61.1 or Chapter 3.1 of Title 20 (§ 20-49.1 et
seq.)." 51
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1989). Subdivision (E)(3) reads as
follows:
If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as prescribed in § 8.01-380, the statute of
limitations with respect to such action shall be tolled by the commencement of the
nonsuited action, and the plaintiff may recommence his action within six months
from the date of the order entered by the court, or within the original period of limi-
tation, or within the limitation period as provided by subdivision B 1, whichever pe-
riod is longer. This tolling provision shall apply irrespective of whether the action is
originally filed in a federal or a state court and recommenced in any other court.
Id. § 8.01-229(E)(3).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983) (repealed 1988).
47. Id. § 20-49.1 to -49.8 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
48. Id. § 64.1-5.1(3)(iii) (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
49. Id. § 64.1-5.2.
50. This problem is discussed in Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of
Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH. L. REv. 759-61 (1988).
51. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-5.1(3)(iii), -5.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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0. Determination of Parentage: Jurisdiction
Section 20-49.2 is amended to provide that circuit courts and ju-
venile and domestic relations district courts have concurrent origi-
nal jurisdiction in cases arising under Chapter 3.1 of Title 20, enti-
tled "Proceedings to Determine Parentage."52
However, an interpretative problem has been created by the
amendment's last sentence which reads as follows: "The determi-
nation of parentage, when raised in any proceeding, shall be gov-
erned by this chapter."5 Query: If the determination of parentage
is raised in a succession proceeding, will it be governed by Title
2054 or by Title 64.1? 55
P. Probate Tax: Rate
The probate tax imposed by section 58.1-1712 has been (i) $0, if
an estate did not exceed $500, (ii) $1.00, if an estate exceeded $500
but did not exceed $5,000, and (iii) $0.10 for each $100 in value, or
fraction thereof, in excess of $5,000. The amendment changes this
to a tax of $0.10 for each $100 in value, or fraction thereof, with no
tax to be imposed on an estate of $5,000 or less. 56
Q. Probate Tax Return
Section 58.1-1714 formerly required a probate tax return to be
filed when the value of an estate exceeded $1,000. The amendment
changes this filing level to $5,000. 51
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 20-49.1 to -49.8 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
55. Id. §§ 64.1-5.1, -5.2.
Section 64.1-5.1 establishes a procedure for the determination of parentage "[i]f, for pur-
poses of this title, a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine suc-
cession by, through or from a person." Id. § 64.1-5.1.
Section 64.1-5.2 provides that "[flor the purposes of this title, evidence that a man is the
father of a child born out of wedlock shall be clear and convincing and shall be limited to
the following [an enumeration, in seven paragraphs, of certain evidences]." Id. § 64.1-5.2.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1712 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1714 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 23:859
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R. Inaccurate Probate Tax Payment
Section 58.1-1717 formerly provided that no additional probate
tax had to be paid, and no refund would be made, if the amount of
the payment or refund would be less than $5.00. The amendment
changes this amount to $25.00.18
S. Small Estates: Waiver of Tax and Court Costs
The language in section 26-12.3 providing that the clerk of court
shall waive the payment of tax or court costs when an estate does
not exceed $5,000 in value, and an heir, beneficiary or creditor
whose claim exceeds the value of the estate seeks qualification, is
deleted. 9 Note, however, that (i) section 14.1-112(4) continues to
provide that no clerk's fee shall be charged upon the qualification
of a personal representative on an estate of $5,000 or less,60 and (ii)
effective July 1, 1989, section 58.1-1712 provides that no probate
tax is imposed on an estate of $5,000 or less."
T. Disposal of Dower and Curtesy
Section 55-40, dealing with how a married woman may dispose
of her contingent right of dower in her husband's realty,62 was held
to be unconstitutional gender-based legislation in a 1988 trial court
decision.63 The amendment rewrites the language of this section to
make its provisions also apply to a married man disposing of his
contingent right of curtesy in his wife's realty.6 4
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1717 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 26.1-12.3 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
60. Id. § 14.1-112(4) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
61. Id. § 58.1-1712 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-40 (Repl. Vol. 1986). Prior to the 1989 amendment, this section
reads as follows:
A married woman may, by uniting with her husband in a deed or contract, dispose
of her contingent right of dower in his real estate; or, if the husband has previously
disposed of his interest in real estate in which she is entitled to a contingent right of
dower, she may thereafter, but not before, dispose of her contingent right of dower in
the same by her sole act as if she were unmarried.
Id.
63. Baker v. Baker, 14 Va. Cir. 99 (1988).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-40 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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U. Dower and Curtesy Synonymous
Section 64.1-19.1 was added to the Code in 197765 to provide
that "[w]here the word 'curtesy' appears in this chapter, it shall be
taken to be synonymous with the word 'dower' as the same appears
in this chapter, and shall be so construed for all purposes. 6 6 Al-
though the primary treatment of dower and curtesy is found in
Chapter 2, of Title 64.1,17 these concepts are also dealt with in a
number of other Code sections outside of Chapter 2. This was the
source of the problem leading to a 1988 trial court decision that
section 55-40 was unconstitutional.68 The amendment seeks to pre-
vent further occurrence of this problem by replacing the word
"chapter" with the word "Code" in both places in section 64.1-
19.1.69 This extension of the "synonymous" rule of section 64.1-
19.1 will solve the problem when husbands or wives are given
rights, or subjected to liabilities, outside of Chapter 2. However,
interpretive problems will continue to exist, within and beyond
Chapter 2, when husbands and wives are given conflicting rights.1 0
V. Debts and Demands Procedure: Notice
One of the optional steps that may be taken by a personal repre-
sentative settling a decedent's estate is a proceeding before the
commissioner of accounts for receiving proof of debts and demands
claimed against the decedent or the decedent's estate. In such a
proceeding, the only notice that has been required by section 64.1-
171 was newspaper publication and posting at the courthouse door,
both of which were accomplished by the commissioner. The basic
thrust of the 1989 amendment to section 64.1-171 is to impose a
65. 1977 Va. Acts 657 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
66. Id.
67. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-19 to -44 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
68. See supra para. T.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
70. For example, one can create jointure which will eliminate a surviving wife's right to
dower if the requirements of sections 64.1-29 and -30 are met. However, even though
these same requirements are met, section 64.1-22 allows a surviving husband to re-
nounce and take curtesy. Query: If 'dower' and 'curtesy' are synonymous, does this
mean (i) that a surviving wife can renounce jointure, (ii) that a surviving husband can
no longer renounce jointure, (iii) that these code sections are void because of their
irreconcilable conflict, or (iv) none of the above? It is submitted that none of the
above is the correct answer and that, if the concept of dower and curtesy is to be
retained, a legislative overhaul of this chapter is the answer.
Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RICH. L. REV.
779, 795 (1985).
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duty upon the personal representative to give written notice to any
known claimant of a disputed claim at least ten days prior to the
date set for the debts and demands hearing."' An interpretive
problem is raised by certain language that this amendment re-
quires to be placed in the notice to a claimant, viz., "and of the
fact that he will be bound by any adverse ruling." Query: Does this
language mean that the claimant will be bound (i) whether or not
he appears and participates in the debts and demands hearing, or
(ii) only if he appears and participates? It appearing that the pur-
pose of this legislation was merely to provide for actual notice to
certain claimants, rather than to effect a fundamental change in
Virginia law, it is believed that the latter interpretation is the bet-
ter. Nevertheless this matter should be clarified by the General As-
sembly to eliminate any doubt.
W. Debts and Demands: Tolling of Limitations
Prior to the 1989 amendment, section 64.1-173 provided that
when a person having a debt or demand against a decedent or a
decedent's estate files a claim before the commissioner, the time
that elapses between this filing and the termination of the debts
and demands proceeding will not be deducted from the limitations
period otherwise applicable to the claim. The 1989 amendment re-
stricts this tolling to instances in which further action to enforce a
claim is "recommended in writing by the commissioner. "72
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-171 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989). The entire text of the
paragraphs added by the 1989 amendment reads as follows:
The fiduciary shall give notice, in writing, to any claimant of a disputed claim
known to the fiduciary at the last address of the claimant known to the fiduciary. The
notice may be by regular, certified or registered mail, or by personal service at least
ten days prior to the date set for hearing. The notice shall inform the claimant of his
right to attend and present his case, of his right to obtain another date if the commis-
sioner of accounts finds the initial date inappropriate, and of the fact that he will be
bound by any adverse ruling. The fiduciary shall also inform the claimant of his right
to file exceptions with the judge in the event of an adverse ruling.
Evidence of any mailing of notice by the fiduciary shall be filed with the commis-
sioner. The commissioner may in a case deemed appropriate to him direct the fiduci-
ary or the claimant or either of them to institute a proceeding at law or in equity to
establish the validity or invalidity of any claim or demand, which he deems not other-
wise sufficiently proved.
Id. (Cum. Supp. 1989).
If the personal representative becomes aware of a disputed claim after the notice of debts
and demands, but prior to the entry of an order of distribution, a 1989 amendment to VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-179 (Cum. Supp. 1989) creates a requirement for notice at that time. See
infra note 77.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-173 (Cum. Supp. 1989). A portion of the language added to §
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X. Debts and Demands: Commissioner's Reports
Section 26-31 requires every account stated under Chapter 2,11
of Title 26, to be reported by the commissioner of accounts. The
amendment adds the following language to section 26-31: "and,
where applicable, reports of debts and demands under § 64.1-
172." " It is unclear why language requiring the reporting of a pro-
cedure arising under Title 64.1 was placed in Title 26. It would
appear that the more appropriate place for language dealing with
the commissioners' reporting of debts and demands would be sec-
tion 64.1-172, entitled "Reports of debts, when and how made. '7 5
In addition, the words "where applicable" cause one to speculate
about the circumstances in which it would not be appropriate for
the commissioners' debts and demands report to be filed in the
clerk's office.
Y. Order of Distribution: Beneficiary Liability
Among other things, section 64.1-179 has provided that, even
though the personal representative has made final distribution of
an estate pursuant to the court's order of distribution:
[E]very legatee or distributee to whom any such payment or delivery
is made, and his representatives, may, in a suit brought against him
within five years afterward, be adjudged to refund a due proportion
of any claims enforceable against the decedent or his estate and the
costs attending their recovery.76
The amendment to section 64.1-179 limits this beneficiary expo-
sure to claims "which have been finally allowed by the commis-
sioner of accounts or the court, or which were not presented to the
commissioner of accounts. '77
64.1-171 reproduced at supra note 35, reads as follows: "The commissioner may in a case
deemed appropriate to him direct the fiduciary or the claimant or either of them to institute
a proceeding at law or in equity to establish the validity or invalidity of any claim or de-
mand, which he deems not otherwise sufficiently proved." Id. § 64.1-171 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
73. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-8 to -37 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
74. Id. § 26-31 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
75. Id. § 64.1-172 (Repl. Vol. 1987). By way of illustration, § 64.1-174 dealing with when
the court orders payment of debts, refers to the debts and demands report having been
"confirmed as provided in Chapter 2 (§ 26-8 et seq.) of Title 26." Id. § 64.1-174.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-179 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
77. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1989). This section is further amended to provide that:
In the event any claim shall become known to the fiduciary after the notice for debts
872 [Vol. 23:859
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Z. Distribution Within One Year: Fiduciary Protection
Among other things, section 64.1-179 has provided for the pro-
tection of a personal representative who makes distribution before
the expiration of the one year period provided in section 64.1-13,78
section 64.1-89, 79 or section 64.1-96,80 provided certain notice re-
quirements are met. The 1989 amendment to section 64.1-179 adds
section 64.1-151.5"' to this listing, without the imposition of any
such notice requirement.2
II. 1988-89 JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Issue of Void Marriages Are Legitimate
In Murphy v. Holland,"' R.P.H., Jr., was born in 1961 to parents
who were living together as common law husband and wife. This
relationship continued until the death of R.P.H., Sr., in 1968. At
this time, Sr.'s mother qualified as his administratrix and listed
herself and her husband as Sr.'s sole heirs. Twenty-three years
later, in 1984, Jr. filed suit seeking to have himself declared to be
the legitimate and sole heir8 4 of Sr., who had died intestate owning
a 77.25 acre parcel of land. In this suit, Jr. testified that he did not
discover the existence of this land, or the fact that his parents were
never married, until he was twenty-one, in mid-1983. 5
Jr.'s mother filed a suit seeking to assert his heirship in 1969,
and demands but prior to the entry of an order of distribution, the claimant, if the
claim is disputed, shall be given notice in the form provided in § 64.1-171 [see supra
note 68 and the order of distribution shall not be entered until after the expiration of
ten days from the giving of such notice. If the claimant shall, within such ten-day
period, indicate his desire to pursue the claim, the commissioner shall schedule a date
for hearing the claim and for reporting thereon if action thereon is contemplated
under § 64.1-171.
Id.
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-13 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (this section is entitled "When and how will
may be renounced").
79. Id. § 64.1-89 (this section is entitled "When bill [to impeach or establish a will] must
be filed and where").
80. Id. § 64.1-96 (this section is entitled "Same [Bona fide purchaser of real estate with-
out notice of devise protected]; later will").
81. Id. § 64.1-151.5 (this section is entitled "When and how exempt property and al-
lowances may be claimed").
82. Id. § 64.1-179 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
83. 237 Va. 212, 377 S.E.2d 363 (1989).
84. Jr.'s parents had one other child, but this child quitclaimed all of his interest in Sr.'s
realty to Jr. in 1983.
85. Murphy, 237 Va. at 213-14, 377 S.E.2d at 364.
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however this suit was dismissed for failure to take any action for a
period in excess of three years. Despite the filing of the suit in
1969, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that "[a]t the earli-
est, time began to run against the claim when [Jr.] became eigh-
teen and, even then, he had a reasonable time within which to
bring the claim."8 6 Measuring from this point, the supreme court
found no evidence in the record that Jr. "intended 'to abandon the
[claim]' or that the delay involved was 'unreasonable and injurious
to the other party' ,,7 and therefore held "that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in overruling Murphy's plea of laches." s
At both the time of Jr.'s birth and Sr.'s death, section 64-7 of the
Code provided that "[tlhe issue of marriages deemed null in law
...shall nevertheless be legitimate."' s9 After examining affirma-
tive precedent, and agreeing that "'the object and purpose of...
[the statute] was to remove the stain and disabilities of bastardy
from all "innocent and unoffending children" who for any cause
might be classed as illegitimate,' "90 the supreme court concluded
that "[w]hile common law marriages are not recognized in Virginia,
they are marriages 'null in law' under Code § 64-7."'91 Accordingly,
the trial court's determination of Jr.'s legitimacy was affirmed.92
Query: When a child is born to persons who are "living to-
gether," is the child legitimate? The relationship between such
persons would not appear to fit within the definition of a common
law marriage used by the supreme court, 3 because of the absence
of "an agreement to marry." Yet such an arrangement would ap-
pear to be recognized today as something more than a mere mere-
tricious relationship, and the announced object and purpose of the
statute is "'to remove the stain and disabilities of bastardy from
86. Id. at 216, 377 S.E.2d at 365.
87. Id. at 216, 377 S.E.2d at 366 (quoting Hamilton v. Newbold, 154 Va. 345, 351, 153 S.E.
681, 682 (1930)).
88. Id.
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7, (Repl. Vol. 1968) (current version, with changes in wording,
at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-31.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983)).
90. Murphy, 237 Va. at 219, 377 S.E.2d 367 (quoting Goodman v. Goodman, 150 Va. 42,
45, 142 S.E. 412, 413 (1928)).
91. Id. at 220, 377 S.E.2d at 368.
92. For a discussion of the rights of illegitimate children to inherit from their parents, see
Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RICH. L. REV.
779, 792-94 (1985).
93. "A common law marriage is '[o]ne not solemnized in the ordinary way (i.e. non-cere-
monial) but created by an agreement to marry, followed by cohabitation." Murphy, 237
Va. at 217 n.1, 377 S.E.2d at 366 n.1 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (5th ed. 1979)).
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all "innocent and unoffending" children who for any cause might
be classed as illegitimate.' "'I
B. Commissioner's Ruling Presumptively Correct
In Morris v. United Virginia Bank, Executor,95 following a debts
and demands hearing wherein the evidence was in sharp conflict,
the commissioner of accounts ruled that the claimant had estab-
lished his claim against decedent's estate.9 6 Contestants filed ex-
ceptions and "the court treated the hearing on exceptions to the
commissioner's report as a trial de novo, at which the burden was
again upon the claimant to establish his claim, with sufficient cor-
roboration, by a preponderance of the evidence. '97
This was error. Although a commissioner's report does not have
the same weight as the verdict of a jury, "'it should be sustained
unless the trial court concludes that the commissioner's findings
are not supported by the evidence.' ,s Although it was proper for
the court to take additional evidence at the hearing, the court
"made no finding that the commissioner's report was unsupported
by the evidence."99 Accordingly, the trial court's ruling in favor of
contestants was reversed and final judgment was entered for
claimant.100
C. Competency to Execute Deed of Gift
In Nelms v. Nelms,0 1 grantee filed a bill in equity seeking a dec-
laration of grantor's competency at the time he executed a certain
deed of gift to grantee, to which respondents filed a cross bill alleg-
ing that the deed resulted from undue influence. 102 After the pres-
entation of all evidence, the chancellor ruled that the respondents
94. Id. at 219, 377 S.E.2d at 367 (quoting Goodman v. Goodman, 150 Va. 42, 45, 142 S.E.
412, 413 (1928)).
95. 237 Va. 331, 377 S.E.2d 611 (1989).
96. Id. at 335, 377 S.E.2d at 613.
97. Id. at 337, 377 S.E.2d at 614.
98. Id. (quoting from Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 576-77, 318 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1984)). This
quotation continues by stating that "'[t]his rule applies with particular force to a commis-
sioner's findings of fact based upon evidence taken in his presence. . . but is not applicable
to pure conclusions of law contained in the report.'" Id. at 337-38, 377 S.E.2d at 614.
99. Id. at 338, 377 S.E.2d at 614.
100. Id. at 339, 377 S.E.2d at 615.
101. 236 Va. 281, 374 S.E.2d 4 (1988).
102. Id. at 283, 374 S.E.2d 5-6.
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had produced no evidence of undue influence, 0 3 instructed the
jury on the competency issue, and submitted the case to the jury
on the following interrogatory: "Did [grantor] possess mental ca-
pacity on February 2, 1981, to execute his deed dated January 12,
1981, conveying his home to his son, [grantee], reserving unto him-
self a life estate in said real estate?"'1 4 The jury returned a nega-
tive answer to this interrogatory and the chancellor "found that
'the verdict is amply sustained by the evidence,' ruled that the ver-
dict should be 'confirmed,'" and declared the deed void. 0 5
The chancellor's ruling showed that he "treated the jury's re-
sponse to the interrogatory as a conventional jury verdict."'' 0 This
was error because the respondent's pleadings "were not pleas in
equity within the intendment of Code § 8.01-336(D)." Although
the chancellor was authorized to submit an interrogatory to a jury
on his own motion, under section 8.01-336(E), the jury's response
in such a case is advisory only.107
It was not error for the chancellor to delete language from an
instruction that " 'the time in which a deed is executed is the vital
time for mental capacity to exist.' ,108 The amended instruction in-
formed the jury that "'the testimony of those present when the
deed in this case was executed is entitled to great weight.' "109 This
is an accurate statement of Virginia law, whereas the original in-
struction "could have led the jury to believe that the testimony of
witnesses present at the execution of the deed was conclusively
dispositive." 1 0
Although the presumption of sanity"' is rebuttable, "'where the
evidence of equally credible witnesses is equally balanced . . . the
103. A footnote to this opinion states that "[w]e also are of opinion that the chancellor's
refusal to advise the jury of his ruling that the evidence of undue influence was insufficient
to support the respondents' allegation in their cross-bill could have influenced the jury's
answer to the interrogatory." Id. at 288 n.2, 374 S.E.2d at 8 n.2.
104. Id. at 285, 374 S.E.2d at 7.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 287, 374 S.E.2d at 8.
107. Id. at 290, 374 S.E.2d at 9.
108. Id. at 286, 374 S.E.2d at 7.
109. Id. at 287, 374 S.E.2d at 8.
110. Id. at 286, 374 S.E.2d at 7.
111. "'There is ... a presumption in favor of the sanity of every man until evidence that
he is of unsound mind is introduced; and this presumption of sanity applies in all cases,
criminal as well as civil.'" Id. at 287, 374 S.E.2d at 8 (quoting Wallen v. Wallen, 107 Va.
131, 150, 57 S.E. 596, 598-99 (1907)).
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presumption will prevail.' ""2 However, instead of being instructed
to this effect, the jury was told that the evidence of grantor's com-
petency had to be "clear and convincing" instead of "by the
greater weight of the evidence.""' 3 The case was sent back for a
new trial because of this error, and the supreme court's assumption
that the verdict upon which the chancellor relied was influenced
thereby.1
14
D. Executor's Standing to Sue
In Andrews v. American Health and Life Insurance Co.," 5 dece-
dent purchased credit life insurance providing for payments pursu-
ant to a policy schedule to be made to lender, with any excess over
the amount required to satisfy the debt owed lender to be paid to
decedent's designated beneficiary or, if none, to decedent's per-
sonal representative. 1 6 The insurance company denied liability fol-
lowing decedent's death and, after paying the debt in full, dece-
dent's executor filed suit for the scheduled amount of insurance.
The supreme court concluded that the policy gave decedent con-
tractual rights independent of lender, and decedent not having
designated a beneficiary, his executor had standing to enforce
these rights.1 7
E. Undue Influence
In Martin v. Phillips,"" four separate suits brought to set aside
a will, a lease, and two deeds were consolidated for a trial without
a jury, at the conclusion of which the chancellor set all of these
documents aside on the ground of undue influence." 9
After reviewing a number of cases, the supreme court concluded
that:
112. Id.
113. Id. at 288, 374 S.E.2d at 8.
114. Id. at 291, 374 S.E.2d at 10.
115. 236 Va. 221, 372 S.E.2d 399 (1988).
116. Id. at 223-24, 372 S.E.2d at 401.
117. Id. at 226, 372 S.E.2d at 402.
118. 235 Va. 523, 369 S.E.2d 397 (1988).
119. Id. at 525, 369 S.E.2d at 398. The supreme court defines this as influence "'sufficient
to destroy free agency on the part of the grantor or testator; it must amount to coercion-
practically duress.'" Id. at 527, 369 S.E.2d at 399 (quoting Wood v. Wood, 109 Va. 470, 472,
63 S.E. 994, 995 (1909)).
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[T]o raise a presumption of undue influence in the execution of a
will, the evidence must show that (1) the testator was enfeebled in
mind when the will was executed, (2) the requisite confidential or
fiduciary relationship was accompanied by activity in procuring or
preparing the favorable will, and (3) the testator previously had ex-
pressed a contrary intention to dispose of his property. Similarly, to
raise a presumption of undue influence in the execution of a deed or
lease, the evidence must show that (1) the grantor (lessor) had great
weakness of mind when the document was executed, (2) the grantee
(lessee) stood in a confidential or fiduciary relationship to the gran-
tor (lessor), either in a formal relationship, or in a less formal rela-
tionship involving matters of a business nature, and (3) the consid-
eration was grossly inadequate or the transaction occurred amidst
"circumstances of suspicion. ' 120
The supreme court emphasized that:
[A] presumption is a rule of law that compels the fact finder to draw
a certain conclusion or a certain inference from a given set of facts.
The primary significance of a presumption is that it operates to shift
to the opposing party the burden of producing evidence tending to
rebut the presumption. 121
Accordingly, "in applying the presumption so that the burden of
persuasion, rather than the burden of production, was placed upon
the proponents," the chancellor erred. 122
The chancellor also erred when he held that the elements of the
presumption of undue influence had been " 'proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.' ,,123 In order "[t]o raise a presumption of
undue influence, each element must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.' 24 For these reasons, the chancellor's deci-
sion was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
120. Id. at 528, 369 S.E.2d at 400.
121. Id. at 526, 369 S.E.2d at 399 (citation omitted). A footnote after the first sentence
notes that "[i]n contrast, an inference, sometimes loosely referred to as a presumption of
fact, does not compel a specific conclusion. An inference merely applies to the rational po-
tency or probative value of an evidentiary fact to which the fact finder may attach whatever
force or weight it deems best." Id. at 526 n.1, 369 S.E.2d at 399 n.1.
In a further footnote, following the second sentence, the court goes on to say that "[an
inference, on the other hand, does not invoke this procedural consequence of shifting the
burden of production." Id. at 526 n.2, 369 S.E.2d at 399 n.2.
122. Id. at 530, 369 S.E.2d at 401.
123. Id. at 526, 369 S.E.2d at 399.
124. Id. at 528, 369 S.E.2d at 400. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as:
'that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a
firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. It is intermedi-
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F. Attorney Fees in Estate Litigation
In duPont v. Shackelford,125 following the settlement of litiga-
tion brought to overthrow decedent's will, counsel for plaintiffs ap-
plied to the trial court for an award of attorney fees and expenses
of "'at least' $1,410,197" from the estate.'26 In affirming the trial
court's denial of any attorney fees, the supreme court addressed
several other matters of interest. First, the purpose of the common
fund doctrine 127 is to eliminate the unfairness that would otherwise
result when the recovery obtained by one party's attorney benefits
another party which is not represented by counsel. In this case,
however, all parties had counsel, all of whom participated in mak-
ing the settlement, and thus no one received a "free ride". The
court concluded that "[i]n Virginia, we have never permitted a
common fund recovery where to do so would require a party who
was represented by counsel to contribute to the counsel fees of
another."'28
Second, without resolving the question whether or not the doc-
trine of judicial instructions exists in Virginia, the supreme court
concluded that complainants were not seeking judicial instructions
but instead were seeking to overthrow decedent's will. 2 '
ate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as
is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear
and unequivocal.'
Id. at 529, 369 S.E.2d at 400 (quoting Gifford v. Dennis, 230 Va. 193, 198 n.1, 335 S.E.2d
371, 373 n.1 (1985)).
125. 235 Va. 588, 369 S.E.2d 673 (1988).
126. Id. at 593, 369 S.E.2d at 676.
127. The common fund doctrine, which applies in decedent's estates as well as cases in-
volving creditors' rights, was adopted in Virginia, in 1879, as follows:
'It is a general practice to require when one creditor, suing for himself and others,
who may come in and contribute to the expenses of suit, institutes proceedings for
their common benefit, that those who derive a benefit shall bear their proportion of
the expense and not throw the whole burden on one. This is equitable and just. But it
only applies to those creditors who derive a benefit from the services of counsel in a
cause in which they are not specially represented by counsel. If a creditor has his
own counsel in a cause, he cannot be required to contribute to the compensation of
another.'
Id. at 594, 369 S.E.2d at 677 (quoting Stoval v. Hardy, 1 Va. Dec. 342, 349 (Special Ct. App.
1879)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 595-96, 369 S.E.2d at 678.
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G. Contract to Make a Will: Anticipatory Repudiation
In Story v. Hargrave,1" 0 following a lengthy recitation of facts,
the supreme court affirmed a trial court finding that decedent had
anticipatorily repudiated her contract to leave her entire estate to
X, in return for life-time care, but found no evidence in the record
to support the trial court's conclusion that the anticipatory repudi-
ation was justified.131 The opinion further noted that X should be
entitled to the benefit of his bargain but that a breach of this cate-
gory of contract is not truly compensable in monetary damages.
Thus the court remanded the case with instructions to impose a
constructive trust on decedent's entire net estate for X's benefit.1 32
H. Classification of Property: Statutory Interpretation
In Teed v. Powell,"'3 T's will, which contained no residuary
clause, left the real estate where she resided, along with all of her
livestock and farm machinery to her two sons, and left her intangi-
ble personal property to her four daughters.1
3 4
Reversing the chancellor's ruling that 1600 bales of hay were
livestock, the supreme court stated that "[w]e need cite no author-
ity to hold, as we do, that the hay was tangible personal prop-
erty. ' 13 5 Regarding the decedent's interest in certain lots of land,
the supreme court reversed the chancellor's ruling that this was
real estate, and held that this interest, "arising as a matter of con-
tract right, was a chose in action. Such an interest is intangible
personal property." s6
One of T's sons, living in her home, claimed that T had made an
inter vivos gift to him of three shotguns and a rifle. This son de-
fended against the argument that inter vivos gifts between persons
residing together are invalid under section 55-3 of the Code," 7 un-
130. 235 Va. 563, 369 S.E.2d 669 (1988).
131. Id. at 568, 369 S.E.2d at 672.
132. Id. at 569-70, 369 S.E.2d at 673.
133. 236 Va. 36, 372 S.E.2d 131 (1988).
134. Id. at 37, 372 S.E.2d at 132.
135. Id. at 38, 372 S.E.2d at 132.
136. Id. at 40, 372 S.E.2d at 134.
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-3 (Repl. Vol. 1986), provides as follows:
No gift of any goods or chattels shall be valid unless by deed or will, or unless actual
possession shall have come to and remained with the donee or some person claiming
under him. If the donor and donee reside together at the time of the gift, possession
at the place of their residence shall not be a sufficient possession within the meaning
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less made by a deed on the ground of the exception contained in
the statute's last sentence for "personal paraphernalia used exclu-
sively by the donee." The supreme court reversed the chancellor
again and adopted a definition of "paraphernalia" that reads
"'personal belongings, esp., articles of adornment or attire, trap-
pings; also the articles that compose an apparatus, outfit or equip-
ment; . . . appointments or appurtenances in general,'" and con-
cluded that firearms were not included therein.13 8
I. Principal and Agent: Conversion: Jury Instructions
In Oden v. Salch, 39 following his wife's death, P moved into the
home of his daughter, A, where he resided until his death eleven
years later, at age 91. Two months after moving into A's home, and
while hospitalized for treatment of a heart attack, P gave A his
general power of attorney. 40 Whether the relationship between P
and A arose because of this document or because of the conduct of
the parties, it was clear that A acted as P's "exclusive agent in
handling and managing his business affairs" during this eleven
year period.14 '
In an action brought by P's personal representative, alleging that
A had fraudulently converted P's assets, the court upheld the cor-
rectness of the following two jury instructions:
The court instructs the jury that under the Power of Attorney, the
defendant, (A), as agent of (P), Deceased, was bound to exercise the
utmost good faith and loyalty to her principal and was duty-bound
not to act adversely to the interest of her principal by serving or
acquiring any private interest of her own in antagonism or opposi-
tion thereto.
The presumption is that people who deal with each other, grown
men and women, deal with each other as such and this presumption
is not destroyed by disparity in age nor by ties of blood, and this is
particularly true where fraud is charged. This presumption does not
of this section. This section shall not apply to personal paraphernalia used exclusively
by the donee.
138. Teed, 236 Va. at 39, 372 S.E.2d at 133 (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2075
(1971)).
139. 237 Va. -, 379 S.E.2d 346 (1989).
140. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 348.
141. Id. at , 379 S.E.2d at 352.
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
apply while acting under the power of attorney.4 2
The court further held that "[t]he qualifying language added to
each instruction by the court was appropriate in light of the evi-
dence and the conflicting theories advanced by the parties.' ' 4 3
This case also contains a discussion of (i) the applicable statute
of limitations, (ii) the admissibility of certain documentary evi-
dence, and (iii) a review of the evidence which was found sufficient
to support the jury's finding of fraud and its damage award.
J. Wills: Ambiguity: Admission of Extrinsic Evidence
In Baker v. Linsey,14 Article II of T's will, executed shortly
before her death and while aware that she was terminally ill, di-
rected that her home be sold and that the net proceeds, after pay-
ment of just debts and administrative expenses, "be used to satisfy
the specific cash bequests set forth below and the remainder, if
any, to be passed under the residue of my estate."'' 45 Article III,
which set forth a number of bequests and cash legacies totaling
$315,000, also contained the following language:
It is my desire that the specific bequests made above be carried out
by my Executor, whose decision and identification of the individual
named articles to the named beneficiary shall be conclusive and fi-
nal, and if there isn't sufficient monies to make all the above be-
quests, then all the money bequest shall be proportionately
reduced.
14 s
In a suit brought by T's executor for advice and guidance and
declaratory judgment, the evidence showed that the net proceeds
available from the sale of T's home would be between $120,000 and
$150,000, and that there were other funds in T's estate of approxi-
mately $210,000. The residuary beneficiary argued that only the
142. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 350-51. The first paragraph was instruction number four,
tendered by P's personal representative. The qualifying language, added by the trial court,
at A's request, was "while acting under the power of attorney." Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 350.
The scene paragraph was instruction number nine, tendered by A. The qualifying language,
added by the trial court is the final, underlined sentence. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 350-51.
143. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 351.
144. 237 Va. ., 379 S.E.2d 327 (1989).
145. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 328.
146. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 328-29 (emphasis added).
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net proceeds from the home could be used to satisfy the bequests,
as provided in Article II, and thus the legacies would have to be
"proportionately reduced" as provided in Article III. T's executor
argued that T wished all of her gifts to be satisfied and that a more
expansive meaning of the word "monies," in Article III, as includ-
ing the other funds in T's estate would allow the legacies to be
satisfied in full. 147
The supreme court concluded that the word "monies" was an
ambiguity14 that, in the proper context, might include "'not only
debts and securities, but the whole personal estate, and even the
proceeds of realty.' ,19 The court further concluded that this am-
biguity was an equivocation,150 which meant that "'all extrinsic
statements by a testator as to his actual testamentary inten-
tions-i.e., as to what he has done, or designs to do, by his will, or
as to the meaning of its words as used by him' are admissible to
show which person or thing he intended and thus to resolve the
equivocation."' 51 After reviewing the extrinsic evidence introduced
below, the court affirmed the chancellor's conclusion that T had
used the word "monies" in the broad sense and thus the other
funds in the estate were available to satisfy the legacies be-
queathed in Article 111.152
K. Wills: Misdescription: Construction
In Picot v. Picot,153 T inherited the fee simple title to the Picot
Farm from her husband upon his death, intestate, on September
14, 1982. T's will, executed thirteen months later, reads in part as
follows:
SECOND: I give and devise all of my real estate, it being my un-
147. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 329.
148. "We have defined 'ambiguity' as 'the condition of admitting of two or more mean-
ings, of being understood in more than one way .. ' " Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 330 (quot-
ing Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 207, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983)).
149. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 329 (quoting Dillard v. Dillard, 97 Va. 434, 438, 34 S.E. 60,
62 (1899)).
150. "An 'equivocation' exists 'where the words in the will describe well, but equally well,
two or more persons, or two or more things.'" Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 330 (quoting Baliles
v. Miller, 231 Va. 48, 57, 340 S.E.2d 805, 811 (1986)).
151. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 330 (quoting Baliles v. Miller, 231 Va. 48, 57-58, 340 S.E.2d
805, 811 (1986)).
152. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 333.
153. 237 Va. -, 379 S.E.2d 364 (1989).
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divided dower interest in the Roy Picot farm to my son, (A), in fee
simple and absolutely, per stirpes. It is my hope and desire that my
home shall continue to be a home for all four of my children, and
their descendents [sic], and I hope that they all continue to utilize
the same and enjoy the same together.
THIRD: All the rest and residue of my estate of every kind and
description, I give, devise and bequeath to my four children, (A, B,
C and D), in fee simple and absolutely and in equal shares, share
and share alike, per stirpes.15 1
B, C and D argued that the reference to the property specifically
devised to A as T's "undivided dower interest" should limit A's
taking on the theory that such reference is (i) repugnant to the
reference to "all of my real estate," and the latter reference should
control, or is (ii) a modification of the earlier language. Although
acknowledging that these rules are sometimes dispositive, the su-
preme court points out that they are "subordinate to the maxim
we have called the 'guiding star' of construction", the testator's in-
tention.15 "'When this intention . . . is ascertained and can be
made effective, the quest is at an end and all other rules become
immaterial.' ",156 Although none of the parties introduced any ex-
trinsic evidence of T's intent, the majority concluded that "her
'general intent' was to devise 'all' she owned in the family farm to
her favorite son and that her 'particulars of description' were 'false
or mistaken.' ,1"17 Under these circumstances, such "'false or mis-
taken particulars of description will be rejected,'" and the gen-
eral intent will control. 15 Accordingly, the chancellor's construc-
tion in favor of A taking the entirety of the farm was sustained." 9
L. "Tenancy by Entirety:" Unmarried Persons: Survivorship
In Gant v. Gant,6 ° two years after their divorce, and while they
were considering remarriage, H and W purchased a house and lot,
taking title thereto as "'[H] and [W], his wife . . . to be held and
154. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 365 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 365.
156. Id. at., 379 S.E.2d at 366 (quoting Wornom v. Hampton N & A. Inst., 144 Va. 533,
541, 132 S.E. 344, 347 (1926)).
157. Id. at , 379 S.E.2d at 367 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 366 (quoting Wooten v. Redd's ex'or & als, 53 Va. (12
Gratt.) 196, 209 (1855) (emphasis added)).
159. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 367.
160. 237 Va. -, 379 S.E.2d 331 (1989).
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owned by them . . . as tenants by the entireties with the right of
survivorship as at common law . . ."161 H and W lived together
on this property but they never remarried and, after a period of
time, H moved out. When H died, survived by his widow, three
daughters, and W, a dispute arose concerning the ownership of this
house and lot.16 2
Although section 55-20 of the Code163 abolishes survivorship in
joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety, there are exceptions
to this rule in section 55-21,6 one of which is applicable "when it
manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was
intended the part of the one dying should then belong to the
others.' 116 5 Although H and W could not hold this property as te-
nants by the entireties, because they were not married to each
other, all of the requisites for joint ownership were present 66 and
the deed expressly provided for survivorship. On these facts the
supreme court affirmed the chancellor's decision that W acquired
sole ownership, by right of survivorship, on H's death. 67
M. Inter-Vivos Gifts: Intent
In Dean v. Dean,"s H, while married to W, purchased stock with
his separate property which he registered in their joint names with
the right of survivorship. Following the divorce of H and W, a
question arose concerning the ownership of this stock. H testified
that he registered the stock jointly in order to provide instant li-
quidity for W upon his death, and to obtain an income tax deduc-
tion for their joint expenses incurred while attending the stock-
holders' annual meeting at the Greenbrier Hotel. H further
161. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 331.
162. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 331-32.
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
164. Id. § 55-21.
165. Id.
166. Tenancies by the entirety are based upon five unities: those of title, estate, time,
possession, and persons. The unity of persons relates to marriage and embodies the common
law fiction that husband and wife are one. A tenancy which lacks the fifth unity but is based
upon the other four is a joint tenancy, for which the first four unities are prerequisite.
Gant, 237 Va. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 332-33.
167. Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 333. The supreme court also held that although the literal
language of VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111 (Repl. Vol. 1983), which converts survivorship tenancies
by entirety into non-survivorship tenancies in common upon divorce, also refers to after
acquired property stating that "it has no effect upon property acquired subsequent to di-
vorce." Id. at -, 379 S.E.2d at 332.
168. 8 Va. App. -, - S.E.2d - (1989).
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testified that he maintained exclusive possession of the stock in his
safe deposit box, to which W had no key, and that he deposited all
dividend checks (issued jointly) in his personal checking
account.6 9
The court of appeals concluded that:
[R]egistration of the stock certificates in their joint names vests le-
gal title and ownership in [H] and [W jointly ... establishes prima
facie that [H] intended to make an inter vivos gift. . . constituted
constructive delivery . . . gave [W] an irrevocable interest in the
stocks, and, thus, surrendered the power of dominion and control
over the stock. 170
The court also called attention to the inconsistency in H's position
that he had made his wife a legal owner by gift for income tax
purposes, in order to deduct her annual meeting expenses, but not
otherwise. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's decision
that H "made an inter vivos gift to [W] when he had the stock
certificates registered jointly, and that the divorce severed the joint
tenancy and converted ownership into a tenancy in common.' 7'
N. Extrinsic Evidence: Admissibility
In Wisely v. United States,72 involving the allowability of the
federal estate tax marital deduction, a question arose concerning
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to establish testamentary in-
tent. The court held that "[w]ell-settled principles of Virginia law
require that where the words of a will are 'plain, clear, and unam-
biguous, extrinsic evidence shall not be considered' in the interpre-
tation of the will.' 7 3
169. Id. at , - S.E.2d at -.
170. Id. at -, - S.E.2d at -.
171. Id. at -, - S.E.2d at -.
172. 703 F. Supp. 474 (W.D. Va. 1988)
173. Id. at 475-76.
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